On AGM for Non-Classical Logics

dc.creatorWASSERMANN, Renata
dc.date.accessioned2012-10-20T04:42:55Z
dc.date.accessioned2018-07-04T15:45:57Z
dc.date.available2012-10-20T04:42:55Z
dc.date.available2018-07-04T15:45:57Z
dc.date.created2012-10-20T04:42:55Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifierJOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC, v.40, n.2, Special Issue, p.271-294, 2011
dc.identifier0022-3611
dc.identifierhttp://producao.usp.br/handle/BDPI/30420
dc.identifier10.1007/s10992-011-9178-2
dc.identifierhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9178-2
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/1627059
dc.description.abstractThe AGM theory of belief revision provides a formal framework to represent the dynamics of epistemic states. In this framework, the beliefs of the agent are usually represented as logical formulas while the change operations are constrained by rationality postulates. In the original proposal, the logic underlying the reasoning was supposed to be supraclassical, among other properties. In this paper, we present some of the existing work in adapting the AGM theory for non-classical logics and discuss their interconnections and what is still missing for each approach.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherSPRINGER
dc.relationJournal of Philosophical Logic
dc.rightsCopyright SPRINGER
dc.rightsclosedAccess
dc.subjectBelief change
dc.subjectPartial meet contraction
dc.subjectNon-classical logics
dc.subjectAGM
dc.titleOn AGM for Non-Classical Logics
dc.typeArtículos de revistas


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