Artículos de revistas
The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
Fecha
2008Registro en:
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, v.36, n.3/Abr, p.621-640, 2008
0020-7276
10.1007/s00182-008-0115-8
Autor
SOTOMAYOR, Marilda
Institución
Resumen
A stable matching rule is used as the outcome function for the Admission game where colleges behave straightforwardly and the students` strategies are given by their preferences over the colleges. We show that the college-optimal stable matching rule implements the set of stable matchings via the Nash equilibrium (NE) concept. For any other stable matching rule the strategic behavior of the students may lead to outcomes that are not stable under the true preferences. We then introduce uncertainty about the matching selected and prove that the natural solution concept is that of NE in the strong sense. A general result shows that the random stable matching rule, as well as any stable matching rule, implements the set of stable matchings via NE in the strong sense. Precise answers are given to the strategic questions raised.