Artículos de revistas
TinyPBC: Pairings for authenticated identity-based non-interactive key distribution in sensor networks
Registro en:
Computer Communications. Elsevier Science Bv, v. 34, n. 3, n. 485, n. 493, 2011.
0140-3664
WOS:000287274400032
10.1016/j.comcom.2010.05.013
Autor
Oliveira, LB
Aranha, DF
Gouvea, CPL
Scott, M
Camara, DF
Lopez, J
Dahab, R
Institución
Resumen
Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) Key distribution in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) is challenging. Symmetric cryptosystems can perform it efficiently, but they often do not provide a perfect trade-off between resilience and storage. Further, even though conventional public key and elliptic curve cryptosystems are computationally feasible on sensor nodes, protocols based on them are not, as they require the exchange and storage of large keys and certificates, which is expensive. Using Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) protocols parties can agree on keys without any interaction. In this work, we (i) show how security in WSNs can be bootstrapped using an authenticated identity-based non-interactive protocol and (ii) present TinyPBC, to our knowledge, the most efficient implementation of PBC primitives for 8, 16 and 32-bit processors commonly found in sensor nodes. TinyPBC is able to compute pairings, the most expensive primitive of PBC, in 1.90 s on ATmega128L, 1.27 s on MSP430 and 0.14 s on PXA27x. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 34 3 SI 485 493 Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) CAPES [4630/06-8, 05/00557-9] FAPESP [07/06950-0]