Brasil
| Artículos de revistas
Economic institutions: explanations for conformity and room for deviation
Registro en:
Journal Of Institutional Economics. Cambridge Univ Press, v. 9, n. 1, n. 81, n. 108, 2013.
1744-1374
1744-1382
WOS:000313977400007
10.1017/S1744137412000197
Autor
Dequech, D
Institución
Resumen
Why do economic agents conform with existing institutions? Drawing on economics and organizational institutionalism, this article identifies existing explanations, extends or refines some of them, suggests new ones, classifies these various explanations, and integrates them into an organized framework. One set of explanations focuses on conformity out of habit. The other refers to more conscious thought and behavior and considers coordination and increasing returns to adoption, social sanctions, informational differences, uncertainty, legitimacy, naturality, and lack of power/resources to deviate. o TEXTO COMPLETO DESTE ARTIGO, ESTARÁ DISPONÍVEL À PARTIR DE AGOSTO DE 2015. 9 1 81 108