Emergência De Convenções Sociais - Uma Análise A Partir Da Simulação De Interações Descentralizadas Caracterizadas Pela Disposição à Imitação De Comportamento

dc.creatorde Oliveira Aggioy G.
dc.date2011
dc.date2015-06-30T20:26:42Z
dc.date2015-11-26T14:49:36Z
dc.date2015-06-30T20:26:42Z
dc.date2015-11-26T14:49:36Z
dc.date.accessioned2018-03-28T22:00:39Z
dc.date.available2018-03-28T22:00:39Z
dc.identifier
dc.identifierRevista Brasileira De Economia. , v. 65, n. 1, p. 3 - 21, 2011.
dc.identifier347140
dc.identifier10.1590/S0034-71402011000100001
dc.identifierhttp://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-79957453431&partnerID=40&md5=02c1dbc1dd253506f9dcfb0d98e705ce
dc.identifierhttp://www.repositorio.unicamp.br/handle/REPOSIP/107954
dc.identifierhttp://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/107954
dc.identifier2-s2.0-79957453431
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/1253954
dc.descriptionThere was considered that social conventions existence is relevant for the individual economic behavior, there has been necessary explain the both its origins and process of formation. Specifically, we study situations where both the presence of multiple equilibria and the possibility of irreversibility of a take decision matters. Then we choose deep the traditions of path depended decentralized evolutionary processes studies. We applied the hypothesis that bounded rationality individuals in some degree imitate the predominant observed behavior and we made a computational procedure of simulations. We observed the emergence of unanimity or majority structures and then we applied the observed results to both the emergence theory of money and technological choice theory.
dc.description65
dc.description1
dc.description3
dc.description21
dc.descriptionAglietta, M., Orléan, A., (2002) La Monnaie Entre Violence et Confiance, , Odile Jacob, Paris
dc.descriptionAnderlini, L., Ianni, A., Competing Technologies Increasing Returns and Learning from Neighbors (1996) Games and Economic Behaviorl, 13, pp. 141-177
dc.descriptionArthur, W.B., Competing Technologies Increasing Returns and Lock-in by Historical Events (1989) The Economic Journal, 99 (394), pp. 116-131
dc.descriptionArthur, W.B., A Learning Algorithm that Mimics Human Learning (1990) Santa Fe Institute Working Paper, , (90-026)
dc.descriptionArthur, W.B., Inductive Reasoning and Bounded Rationality (1994) The American Economic Review, 84 (2), pp. 406-411
dc.descriptionAxelrod, R., Tesfatsion, L., A guide for newcomers to agent-based modeling in social sciences (2006) Handbook of Computational Economics, 2. , Tesfatsion, L. & l. Judd, K., editors, Agent-Based Computational Economics, Handbooks in Economics Series. Elsevier, Amsterdam
dc.descriptionCarpenter, J.P., Evolutionary Models of Bargaining: Comparing Agent-Based Computational and Analytical Approaches to Understanding Convention Evolution (2002) Computational Economics, 19, pp. 25-49
dc.descriptionDequech, D., Institutions, Social Norms, and Decision-Theoretic Norms (2009) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 72 (1), pp. 70-78
dc.descriptionEpstein, J.M., Axtell, R., (1996) Growing Artificial Societies - Social Science from the Bottom Up, , The MIT Press, Cambridge
dc.descriptionFama, E.F., The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices (1965) The Journal of Business, 38 (1), pp. 34-105
dc.descriptionFlake, G.W., (1999) The Computational Beauty of Nature - Computer Explorations of Fractals, Chaos, Complex Systems and Adaptation, , The MIT PRESS, Cambridge
dc.descriptionHahn, F., The Next Hundred Years (1991) The Economic Journal, 101 (404), pp. 47-50
dc.descriptionHume, D., (1740) A Treatise of Human Nature, , Claredon Press, Cambridge, 2 edition 1978
dc.descriptionHume, D., Of money (1752) David Hume: Political Essays, , Haakonssen, K., editor Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994
dc.descriptionHuyck, J., Battalio, R., Mathur, S., Huyck, P., Ortmann, A., On Origen of Convention: Evidence from Symetric Bargaining Games (1995) International Journal of Game Theory, 24, pp. 187-212
dc.descriptionJevons, W.S., Barter, money and the mechanism of exchange (1910) Monetary Theory, , Clower, R. W., editor, Penguin Books. 1969
dc.descriptionKeynes, J.M., (1936) The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, of The Collected Writtings of Jonh Maynard Keynes, 7. , Macmillan, Londres. 1973
dc.descriptionKiyotaki, N., Wright, R., On Money as Medium of Exchange (1989) Journal of Political Economy, 97 (4), pp. 927-954
dc.descriptionKiyotaki, N., Wright, R., A contribution to the Pure Theory of Money (1991) Journal of Economic Theory, 53, pp. 215-235
dc.descriptionKiyotaki, N., Wright, R., A Search-Theoretic Approach to Monetary Economics (1993) The American Economic Review, 83 (1), pp. 63-77
dc.descriptionKlein, P.G., Selgin, G., Menger's theory of money: Some experimental evidence (2000) What is Money?, , Smithin, J., editor, Routledge, Londres
dc.descriptionLewis, D., (1969) Convention: A Philosophical Study, , Blackwell, Malden. 2002
dc.descriptionLocke, J., (1690) The Second Treatise of Goverment, , The Library of Liberal Arts, Indianápolis. 1981
dc.descriptionMarimon, R., Mcgrattan, E., Sargent, T.J., Money as a Medium of Exchange in a Economy with Artificially Intelligent Agents (1990) Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 14 (2), pp. 329-373
dc.descriptionMenger, C., (1871) Principles of Economics, p. 1950. , The Free Press, Glencoe
dc.descriptionMenger, C., On the Origen of Money (1892) The Economic Journal, 2 (6), pp. 239-255
dc.descriptionMenger, C., Money (1909) Carl Menger and the Evolution of Payment Systems: From Barter to Electronic Money, , Latzer, M. & Schmitz, S.W., editors, Edward Elgar. 2002
dc.descriptionMill, J.S., (1848) Principles of Political Economy, , J. W. Parker, Londres. 1997
dc.descriptionO'Driscoll, G.P., Money: Menger's Evolutionary Theory (1986) History of Political Economy, 18 (4), pp. 601-616
dc.descriptionO'Driscoll, G.P., Rizzo, M.J., (1996) The Economics of Time and Ignorance, , Routledge, Londres
dc.descriptionOrléan, A., Monnaie et speculation mimétique (1985) Violence et Verité, , Dumouchel, P., editor, Grasset
dc.descriptionOrléan, A., Informacional influences and the ambivalence of imitation (1998) Advances in Self-Organization and Evolucionary Economics, , Lesourne, J. & Orléan, A., editors. Economica
dc.descriptionPrado, E.F.S., O modelo de Kiyotaki-Wright: Uma versão de Economia Clássica (2001) Revista de Economia Contemporânea, 5 (2), pp. 201-220
dc.descriptionRosenberg, N., On Technological Expectation (1976) The Economic Journal, 86 (343), pp. 523-535
dc.descriptionSchelling, T.C., (1960) The Strategy of Conflict, , Harvard University Press, Cambridge
dc.descriptionSugden, R., (1986) The Evolution of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare, , Basil Blackwell, Nova York
dc.descriptionTobin, J., Money as social institution and public good (1992) The New palgrave Dictionary of Finance and Money, , Eatwell J., Milgate, M., & Newman, P., editors, Macmillan
dc.descriptionVega-Redondo, F., (1996) Evolution, Games and Economic Behavior, , Oxford University Press, Oxford
dc.descriptionYoung, H.P., The Evolution of Convention (1993) Econometrica, 61 (1), pp. 57-84
dc.descriptionYoung, H.P., The Economics of Convention (1996) Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10 (2), pp. 105-122
dc.descriptionYoung, H.P., (1998) Individual Strategy and Social Structure, , Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2 edition. 2001
dc.languagept
dc.publisher
dc.relationRevista Brasileira de Economia
dc.rightsaberto
dc.sourceScopus
dc.titleEmergência De Convenções Sociais - Uma Análise A Partir Da Simulação De Interações Descentralizadas Caracterizadas Pela Disposição à Imitação De Comportamento
dc.typeArtículos de revistas


Este ítem pertenece a la siguiente institución