Traditional wisdom on the effect of re-election on incumbent performance is that first-term politicians refrain from rent extraction because they want to be re-elected. The authors find no evidence to support this belief. ...

What does the reelected have? The return: the outline of a reelection theory in Brazil. This article compares the determinants of electoral success in two consecutive Brazilian legislative elections, 1998 and 2002. There ...

This paper uses a new panel of more than 2,000 Brazilian municipalities over 13 years to analyze the influence of public expenditures on the probability of mayors` reelection. We examine Brazilian municipal elections from ...

Is a comparatively diminutive budget item – government expenditures on advertising in the news media – imperiling an effective news media and a transparent and competitive electoral process? High government expenditures ...

An incumbent’s drive for reelection can lead to political budget cycles. The distortion cycles cause in economic policy may be offset by the information they indirectly provide about the incumbent's competency. The ...

This paper uses a unique dataset of political corruption, constructed from municipal audit reports obtained from Brazil’s randomized anti-corruption program, to test whether reelection incentives affect the level of rent ...

This article addresses the paradox of unpopular corruption and popular corrupt politicians. It explores why corrupt politicians are reelected, paying particular attention to incumbent provision of public goods and voter ...