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The Trade-Off Between Incentives and Endogenous RiskThe Trade-Off Between Incentives and Endogenous Risk
(Sociedade Brasileira de Econometria, 2007)
The trade-off between incentives and endogenous risk
(Sociedade Brasileira de Econometria, 2007-11-01)
Negative relationship between risk and incentives, predicted by standard moral hazard models, has not been confirmed by empirical work. We propose a moral hazard model in which heterogeneous risk-averse agents can control ...
Evidence on the relationship between incentives and exogenous risk
(Fundação Getulio Vargas. Escola de Pós-graduação em Economia, 2002-09-26)
Theoretical models on moral hazard provide competing predictions on the incentive-risk relationship. These predictions are derived under the assumptions of homogeneous agents and exogenous risk. However, the existing ...
The trade-off between incentives and endogenous risk
(Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV, 2004-02-01)
Standard models of moral hazard predict a negative relationship between risk and incentives, but the empirical work has not confirmed this prediction. In this paper, we propose a model with adverse selection followed by ...
Performance-based compensation vs. guaranteed compensation: contractual incentives and performance
(2013-12-05)
Top management from retail banks must delegate authority to lower-level managers to operate branches and service centers. Doing so, they must navigate through conflicts of interest, asymmetric information and limited ...
Incentives in Brazilian Bolsa Família CCT Program: Adverse selection, moral hazard, improving mechanisms and simulations
(Sociedade Brasileira de Econometria, 2020)
Ogres and tarocafarrafes within the malecu narrative: identity and moral incentiveOgros y tarocafárrafas en los malecus: identidad y aliciente moral
(Universidad de Costa Rica, Sede de Occidente, 2019)
Performance-based compensation vs. Guaranteed compensation: contractual incentives and performance in the Brazilian banking industry
(Universidade de Sao Paolo, 2014)
Top management from retail banks must delegate authority to lowerlevel managers to operate branches and service centers. Doing so, they must navigate through conflicts of interest, asymmetric information and limited ...