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Comparing voting by committees according to their manipulability
(American Economic Association, 2017-11)
We consider the class of voting by committees to be used by a society to collectively choose a subset from a given set of objects. We offer a simple criterion to compare two voting by committees without dummy agents according ...
Application of voting methods in surveys
(Universidad Nacional de Misiones. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Programa de Posgrado en Administración, 2021-11-17)
The theory of social election has had great presence in the universities curricula careers be they economy orientated, graduate or post graduate degrees. It has to do with collective decision making as from the individual ...
Disentangling the effect of private and public cash flows on firm value
(2017)
This paper presents a simple model for dual-class stock shares, in which common shareholders receive both public and private cash flows (i.e. dividends and any private benefit of holding voting rights) and preferred ...
Counting on My Vote Not Counting: Expressive Voting in Committees
(Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE, 2020)
A committee chooses whether to approve a proposal that some members may consider ethical. Members who vote for the proposal receive expressive utility, and all pay a cost if the proposal is accepted. Committee members have ...
Planning for democracy in protected rural areas: application of a voting method in a Spanish-Portuguese reserve
The planning of protected rural areas is usually defined by institutional decision-makers without considering the preferences of the local communities that live on the land, which frequently leads to conflicts in land ...
An undominated nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
(Elsevier, 2007-03)
We consider the problem of a society whose members choose, with a voting by committees, a subset of new members from a given set of candidates. After knowing the elected candidates, former members may decide to either stay ...