We study repeated Bayesian games with communication and observable actions in which the players’ privately known payoffs evolve according to an irreducible Markov chain whose transitions are independent across players. ...

When investment in individual reputation cannot solve contract incompleteness, group reputation becomes crucial to achieve social cooperation. In this article we develop a formal model in which the link between social ...

This paper presents a model of the interactions between a dictator and a mass of citizens in which the dictator might have an incentive to use hidden repression. Most papers on political economy of dictatorships assume ...

Bulow and Rogoff (1989) proved that, in a competitive financial market, the threat of credit exclusion alone cannot sustain repayment of sovereign debt, as the defaulting government can still enter cash-in-advance insurance ...

Nós consideramos um modelo de leilões com divisão de prêmios com dois participantes ex-ante idênticos privadamente informados cuja informação privada afeta seus custos de produção das quantias designadas. Podemos interpretar ...