Buscar
Mostrando ítems 1-10 de 327
Principal-Agent Contracts under the Threat of Insurance
(Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía, 2004-04)
The direction of the insured's defense and the problem of the interests in conflict.
Liability insurance contract's legal design grants the direction of the defense of the liability claim and lawsuit to the insurer. Sometimes, the interests of insurer and insured are opposed, which is manifested in the ...
Do insurance defrauders want to be punished?
(Fundação Getulio Vargas. Escola de Pós-graduação em Economia, 2000-08-23)
We analyze a Principal-Agent model of an insurer who faces an adverse selection problem. He is unable to observe if his client has a high risk or a low risk of having an accident. At the underwriting of the contract, the ...
Minimum coverage regulation in insurance markets
(Springer, 2015)
We study the consequences of imposing a minimum coverage in an insurance market where enrollment is mandatory and agents have private information on their true risk type. If the regulation is not too stringent, the equilibrium ...
Welfare consequences of persistent climate prediction errors on the insurance markets against natural hazards
(Universidade Federal de Minas GeraisBrasilFCE - DEPARTAMENTO DE DEMOGRAFIAUFMG, 2018)
Productor de seguros
(Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje (SENA)Subdirección de Formación Profesional y Desarrollo Social. División del Sector Comercio y Servicios, 2017)
La New-York life insurance company (Folleto).
(Guayaquil, Ecuador : Imp. de La Nación., 2016)
Optimal unemployment insurance for couples
(2015-05-29)
This work analyzes the optimal design of an unemployment insurance program for couples, whose joint search problem in the labor market differ significantly from the problem faced by single agents. We use a version of the ...
Environmental insurance analysis from an economic approach
(LLC “Consulting Publishing Company “Business Perspectives”, 2018)