We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the ...

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the ...

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy et al. (Econ Theory 18, 321-332, 2001) that if we allow for free disposal ...

Some tourism and recreational values are estimated by the travel cost method (TCM) using secondary data. The purpose of the primary collection could suffer from incentive compatibility problems. This being the case, the ...

We study a network of buyers and sellers where each seller owns an indivisible object and has no incentive to keep it, while each buyer has a downward sloping demand curve which is private information. Only the connected ...

We study a network of buyers and sellers where each seller owns an indivisible object and has no incentive to keep it, while each buyer has a downward sloping demand curve which is private information. Only the connected ...

We study the revenue maximization problem of a seller who is partially informed about the distribution of buyer's valuations, only knowing its first N moments. The seller chooses the mechanism generating the best revenue ...

We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of ...

We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals in a public good context. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which ...