In a two-period economy with incomplete markets and possibility of default we consider the two classical ways to enforce the honor of financial commitments: by using utility penalties and by using collateral requirements ...

Without introducing neither debt constraints nor transversality conditions to avoid the possibility of Ponzi schemes, we show existence of equilibrium in an incomplete markets economy with a collateral structure.

We develop a general equilibrium model of wealth transfers in the presence of uncertain lifetimes and default. Without introducing exogenous debt constraints, agents are allowed to make collateral-backed promises at any ...

In infinite horizon financial markets economies, competitive equilibria fail to exist if one does not impose restrictions on agents' trades that rule out Ponzi schemes. When there is limited commitment and collateral ...

In this paper, we first compare house price cycles in advanced and emerging economies using a new quarterly house price data set covering the period 1990–2012. We find that house prices in emerging economies grow faster, ...

In this chapter we extend a new Keynesian open economy model to include a housing market and credit constraints in line with Iacoviello (2005). This setup allows us to study the effect of changes in credit conditions, ...

In this chapter we extend a new Keynesian open economy model to include a housing market and credit constraints in line with Iacoviello (2005). This setup allows us to study the effect of changes in credit conditions, ...

In this chapter we extend a new Keynesian open economy model to include a housing market and credit constraints in line with Iacoviello (2005). This setup allows us to study the effect of changes in credit conditions, ...