We analyze the manipulability of competitive equilibrium allocation rules for the simplest many-to-many extension of Shapley and Shubik’s (Int J Game Theory 1:111–130, 1972) assignment game. First, we show that if an agent ...

We study economies where all commodities are indivisible at the individual level, but perfectly divisible at the aggregate level of the economy. Under the survival assumption, we show that a competitive outcome in the ...

This paper investigates an economy where all consumption goods are indivisible at the individual level, but perfectly divisible at the overall level of the economy. In order to facilitate trading of goods, we introduce ...

This paper investigates the limit properties of a sequence of competitive outcomes existing for economies where all commodities are indivisible, as indivisibility vanishes. The nature of this limit depends on whether the ...

We study a production economy where all consumption goods are indivisible at the individual level but perfectly divisible at the overall economy level. In order to facilitate the exchange in this setting, we introduce a ...

This paper shows that a competitive equilibrium model, where a representative agent maximizes welfare, expectations are rational and markets are in equilibrium can account for several hyperinflation stylized facts. The ...

This paper shows existence of approximate recursive equilibrium with minimal state space in an environment of incomplete markets. We prove that the approximate recursive equilibrium implements an approximate sequential ...

The paper proposes an alternative general equilibrium formulation of financial asset economies with transaction costs. Transaction costs emerge endogenously at equilibrium and reflect agents' decisions of intermediating ...

Radner (1968) proved the existence of a competitive equilibrium for differential information economies with finitely many states. We extend this result to economies with infinitely many states of nature.

We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and contains ...