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Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions [Game theory]
(Yale University, Open Yale Courses, 2011)
Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions [Game theory]
(Yale University, Open Yale Courses, 2016)
Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking-down backward induction
(Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV, 1992-02)
We present two alternative definitions of Nash equilibrium for two person games in the presence af uncertainty, in the sense of Knight. We use the formalization of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show that, ...
Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining [Game theory]
(Yale University, Open Yale Courses, 2016)
Backward induction: commitment, spies, and first-mover advantages [Game theory]
(Yale University, Open Yale Courses, 2016)
Backward induction: commitment, spies, and first-mover advantages [Game theory]
(Yale University, Open Yale Courses, 2011)
Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats [Game theory]
(Yale University, Open Yale Courses, 2016)
Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats [Game theory]
(Yale University, Open Yale Courses, 2011)
Backward induction: reputation and duels [Game theory]
(Yale University, Open Yale Courses, 2016)