We study repeated Bayesian games with communication and observable actions in which the players’ privately known payoffs evolve according to an irreducible Markov chain whose transitions are independent across players. ...

This is part of a larger project to investigate the Bayesian foundations of non-cooperative solution concepts. Elsewhere Bernheim and Pearce prove that common knowledge of Bayesian rationality is not enough to justify the ...

Transmission has established itself as a natural monopoly, and as such, the prices and remaining access and operating conditions of the transmission system have been regulated. In the regulations existing before the electric ...

The debate on which is the best incentive for transmission expansion is still active. Discussions center on economic mechanisms based on game theory to expand transmission. There is a mix of experiences and they vary in ...

We present a formal analysis of Douglas Hofstadter?s concept of superrationality. We start by defining superrationally justifiable actions, and study them in symmetric games. We then model the beliefs of the players, in a ...

We transform a non co-operati ve game into a -Bayesian decision problem for each player where the uncertainty faced by a player is the strategy choices of the other players, the pr iors of other players on the choice of ...

In this work we review the formalism used in describing the thermodynamics of first-order phase transitions from the point of view of maximum entropy inference. We present the concepts of transition temperature, latent ...

Um veículo de imprensa e um eleitor desejam que políticas sejam implementadas se, e somente se, aumentem o bem estar social. A Imprensa tem o poder de decidir como informar o Eleitor - que tem acesso gratuito à informação ...