Field experiments were conducted with farmers in the Limari Valley of Chile to test extant theory on right-to-choose auctions. Water volumes that differed by reservoir source and time of availability were offered for sale ...

We study endogenous-participation auctions where bidders only know the number of potential participants. After seeing their values for the object, potential participants decide whether or not to enter the auction. They may ...

Essa dissertação é um estudo de caso experimental em laboratório com três tipos de leilão reverso, visando aplicar as lições aprendidas no experimento a um caso real. Como há diversos tipos de leilão disponíveis, selecionar ...

The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable ...

In this paper we report the results of an experiment designed to examine the properties of a hybrid auction - a Dutch-Vickrey auction, that combines a sealed bid …rst-price auction with a sealed bid second-price auction. ...

Within the context of a single-unit, independent private values auction model, we show that if bidder types are multidimensional, then under the optimal auction exclusion of some bidder types will occur. A second contribution ...

We characterize the optimal selling mechanism when bidders have ownership links among them (crossholdings). This mechanism discriminates against bidders who enjoy a value comparative advantage resulting from the extent to ...

Attracting bidders to an auction is a key factor in determining revenue. We experimentally investigate entry and bidding behavior in first-price and English clock auctions to determine the revenue implications of entry. ...

Chile has become one of the first few countries where renewable sources compete directly with conventional generation in price-based auctions. Moreover, the results of energy auctions during the last few years show a ...