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Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game
(SPRINGER HEIDELBERG, 2009)
Starting with an initial price vector, prices are adjusted in order to eliminate the excess demand and at the same time to keep the transfers to the sellers as low as possible. In each step of the auction, to which set of ...
School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms
(Universidad del RosarioFacultad de Economía, 2017)
We consider school choice problems (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003) where students are assigned to public schools through a centralized assignment mechanism. We study the family of so-called rank-priority mechanisms, each ...
On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
(Universidad del RosarioFacultad de Economía, 2012)
We consider two–sided many–to–many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ ...
Rotation-discriminating template matching based on Fourier coefficients of radial projections with robustness to scaling and partial occlusion
(ELSEVIER SCI LTD, 2010)
We consider brightness/contrast-invariant and rotation-discriminating template matching that searches an image to analyze A for a query image Q We propose to use the complex coefficients of the discrete Fourier transform ...
Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant ...
Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare [preprint]
This paper studies many-to-one matching markets where each student is assigned to a hospital. Each hospital has possibly multiple positions and responsive preferences. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable ...
Some remarks on the multiple partners game; The existence of stable matchings for the marriage market: a non-constructive elementary proof. (a note)
(Universidade Federal do Rio de JaneiroBrasilUFRJ::Centro de Ciências Jurídicas e Econômicas::Instituto de EconomiaUFRJ, 2021)
Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games
(SPRINGER HEIDELBERG, 2010)
Stability of matchings was proved to be a new cooperative equilibrium concept in Sotomayor (Dynamics and equilibrium: essays in honor to D. Gale, 1992). That paper introduces the innovation of treating as multi-dimensional ...
Equivalences between two matching models: Stability
(American Institute of Mathematical Sciences, 2018-02)
We study the equivalences between two matching models, wherethe agents in one side of the market, the workers, have responsive preferenceson the set of agents of the other side, the firms. We modify the firms? preferenceson ...