Artículos de revistas
The liberal and republican model of freedom: a disjunctive choice?
Registro en:
Trans-form-acao. Unesp-marilia, v. 34, n. 1, n. 43, n. 66, 2011.
0101-3173
WOS:000290631700004
Autor
Ramos, CA
Institución
Resumen
The purpose of this article is presenting two ways of understanding freedom: the negative freedom of liberalism, defined as the sphere of the individual's freewill by the absence of improper external obstacles, oriented by the juridical paradigm of the individual rights; and the political freedom of republicanism, defined as no-domination and oriented by the paradigm of the citizenship's civic virtues. Another purpose is to show that opposition between the juridical-liberal point of view and the republicanism is not on the acceptance or in the refuse of freedom and individual rights. The distinction lies on the way which these liberty and rights can be founded: through the way of the individualism and subjectivism that subordinate society and law as instruments for the fulfillment and protection of individual rights, or through the communitarist and civic way. Being thus, the republican concept of freedom, without abandoning the liberal conquer of pluralism and negative freedom, may contribute for an effective enlargement and guarantee of the democratic principles of a modern society. 34 1 43 66