Artigo de Periódico
Governança corporativa e earnings management em empresas negociadas na BM&FBOVESPA
Fecha
2017Autor
Laise Ferraz Correia
Hudson Fernandes Amaral
Pascal Louvet
Institución
Resumen
he purpose of this paper was to analyze the relationship between
governance mechanisms, earnings management, the quality of financial
information disclosed and firm-level characteristics of companies listed on
BM&FBOVESPA. The argument was built upon the Jensen and Meckling (1976)
bonding costs hypothesis, the Bushman and Smith (2003) argument about the
quality of information disclosed and, on the empirical evidence such as Leuz,
Nanda and Wysocki (2003), Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and LaFond (2004),
Fernandes and Ferreira (2007) and, in the Brazilian context, Lopes and
Tukamoto (2007), Martinez (2001, 2010a) and Barros, Soares and Lima (2013),
Holanda, Rebouças and Coelho (2013) and Mazzioni et al (2015). We find out
that earnings management associates negatively with the gross revenue. This
suggests the higher the growth opportunities, the lower earnings
management level. We also find an inverse relationship between earnings
management and dependence on external resources. The analysis of the
determinants of the quality of profits disclosed showed an inverse and
significant relationship with ownership concentration. This research contributes
to the literature on the relationship between governance and earnings
management since it analyses if in an environment of high ownership
concentration and boards controlled by large shareholders like the Brazilian
market, the governance mechanisms effectively allow to restrain earnings
management levels. To sum up, the empirical evidences found allow us to
make the conclusion that only ownership dispersion is effective in achieving
this purpose.