Artículo de revista
The Epistemic Indispensability Argument
Fecha
2019Registro en:
Journal for General Philosophy of Science, Volumen 50, Issue 1, 2019, Pages 145-161
15728587
09254560
10.1007/s10838-018-9437-9
Autor
Soto, Cristian
Institución
Resumen
This article elaborates the epistemic indispensability argument, which fully embraces the epistemic contribution of mathematics to science, but rejects the contention that such a contribution is a reason for granting reality to mathematicalia. Section 1 introduces the distinction between ontological and epistemic readings of the indispensability argument. Section 2 outlines some of the main flaws of the first premise of the ontological reading. Section 3 advances the epistemic indispensability argument in view of both applied and pure mathematics. And Sect. 4 makes a case for the epistemic approach, which firstly calls into question the appeal to inference to the best explanation in the defense of the indispensability claim; secondly, distinguishes between mathematical and physical posits; and thirdly, argues that even though some may think that inference to the best explanation works in the postulation of physical posits, no similar considerations are avai