dc.creator | González Tissinetti, Aldo | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-07-04T01:38:37Z | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-04-26T01:16:57Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-07-04T01:38:37Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-04-26T01:16:57Z | |
dc.date.created | 2017-07-04T01:38:37Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
dc.identifier | Series Documentos de Trabajo, Mayo, 2007 | |
dc.identifier | http://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/144548 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/2448521 | |
dc.description.abstract | This article investigates how antitrust agencies should structure
the disclosing of information about e¢ ciency gains from interested
parties (merging Örms, and competitors) in merger control.
We analyze the particular case of a horizontal merger with
danger of foreclosure, where welfare can decrease either due to
insu¢ cient e¢ ciency gains (e¢ ciency defense) or due to excessive
e¢ ciency gains if the competitor exits (e¢ ciency o§ense).
The Örst result is that evidence from competitors is not required
unless the ex-ante market shares of the merging Örms exceed a
threshold. Second, we support the role of advocacy of the parties.
The burden of proof for the e¢ ciency defense should rest
on the insiders (merging Örms) whereas the burden of proof for
the e¢ ciency o§ense should rest on outsiders (competitors). Finally,
it is optimal to make insiders report Örst and outsiders second
and any communication among parties has to be prohibited. | |
dc.language | en | |
dc.publisher | Universidad de Chile, Facultad de Economía y Negocios | |
dc.rights | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/ | |
dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile | |
dc.source | Series Documentos de Trabajo | |
dc.subject | Competition Policy | |
dc.subject | Merger Control | |
dc.subject | Efficiency Gains | |
dc.subject | Asymmetry of Information | |
dc.title | Eliciting Information from Interested parties in merger control | |
dc.type | Documentos de trabajo | |