dc.contributor | Bardey, David | |
dc.creator | García Rubiano, Juan Pablo | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-05-03T17:44:13Z | |
dc.date.available | 2011-05-03T17:44:13Z | |
dc.date.created | 2011-05-03T17:44:13Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
dc.identifier | TMEC 0004 2011 | |
dc.identifier | http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/2416 | |
dc.identifier | https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_2416 | |
dc.description.abstract | I test the presence of hidden information and action in the automobile insurance market
using a data set from several Colombian insurers. To identify the presence of hidden information
I find a common knowledge variable providing information on policyholder s
risk type which is related to both experienced risk and insurance demand and that was excluded
from the pricing mechanism. Such unused variable is the record of policyholder s
traffic offenses. I find evidence of adverse selection in six of the nine insurance companies
for which the test is performed. From the point of view of hidden action I develop
a dynamic model of effort in accident prevention given an insurance contract with bonus
experience rating scheme and I show that individual accident probability decreases with
previous accidents. This result brings a testable implication for the empirical identification
of hidden action and based on that result I estimate an econometric model of the time
spans between the purchase of the insurance and the first claim, between the first claim
and the second one, and so on. I find strong evidence on the existence of unobserved heterogeneity
that deceives the testable implication. Once the unobserved heterogeneity is
controlled, I find conclusive statistical grounds supporting the presence of moral hazard
in the Colombian insurance market. | |
dc.language | spa | |
dc.publisher | Universidad del Rosario | |
dc.publisher | Maestría en Economía | |
dc.publisher | Facultad de Economía | |
dc.rights | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/ | |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
dc.rights | Abierto (Texto completo) | |
dc.rights | Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia | |
dc.rights | EL AUTOR, manifiesta que la obra objeto de la presente autorización es original y la realizó sin violar o usurpar derechos de autor de terceros, por lo tanto la obra es de exclusiva autoría y tiene la titularidad sobre la misma.
PARÁGRAFO: En caso de presentarse cualquier reclamación o acción
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EL AUTOR, autoriza a LA UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO, para que en los términos establecidos en la Ley 23 de 1982, Ley 44 de 1993, Decisión andina 351 de 1993, Decreto 460 de 1995 y demás normas generales sobre la materia, utilice y use la obra objeto de la presente autorización. | |
dc.source | instname:Universidad del Rosario | |
dc.source | reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR | |
dc.subject | Insurance | |
dc.subject | Adverse selection | |
dc.subject | Moral hazard | |
dc.subject | Empirical tests of contract theory | |
dc.title | Testing for Hidden Information and Action in Automobile Insurance Market | |
dc.type | masterThesis | |