| dc.creator | Fonseca-Mairena, María | |
| dc.creator | Triossi, Matteo | |
| dc.date | 2023-05-08T21:12:55Z | |
| dc.date | 2023-05-08T21:12:55Z | |
| dc.date | 2023 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-05-02T20:31:12Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2024-05-02T20:31:12Z | |
| dc.identifier | http://repositorio.ucm.cl/handle/ucm/4764 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/9275002 | |
| dc.description | We study coalition formation problems with externalities. We prove that, if expectations are not prudent a stable coalitions structure may fail to exist. Under prudent expectations a stable and efficient coalition structure exists if the set of admissible coalitions is single-lapping. However, under this assumption the stable set is not a singleton, and no stable strategy-proof revelation mechanism exists, differently from the case without externalities. Finally, the stable correspondence is Nash implementable. | |
| dc.language | en | |
| dc.rights | Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 Chile | |
| dc.rights | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/ | |
| dc.source | Economics Letters, 226,111112 | |
| dc.title | Coalition formation problems with externalities | |
| dc.type | Article | |
