Is the Consumer Welfare Obsolete? A European Union Competition Law and Competition Perspective

¿Es obsoleto el bienestar del consumidor? Una perspectiva de la competencia en la Unión Europea;
O bem-estar do consumidor se tornou obsoleto? Uma perspectiva de concorrência da União Europeia

dc.creatorMarty, Frédéric
dc.date2021-08-06
dc.date2023-03-22T18:52:56Z
dc.date2023-03-22T18:52:56Z
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-06T17:53:46Z
dc.date.available2023-09-06T17:53:46Z
dc.identifierhttps://revistas.unimilitar.edu.co/index.php/dere/article/view/4722
dc.identifier10.18359/prole.4722
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10654/42686
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8693341
dc.descriptionIn 2005, the European Commission advocated for a more economic approach to enforcing competition laws. The sole criterion for assessing the lawfulness of a market practice should be the appraisal of its net effect on consumer welfare. The Court of Justice was reluctant to adopt such an approach until its 2017 Intel Judgment. Its endorsement—which is debatable insofar as the judgment may give rise to different interpretations—may appear paradoxical in that it is concomitant with a sharp challenge to the consumer welfare criterion in the United States. The purpose of this article is to retrace the history of this criterion, particularly its adoption in the context of EU competition law. We aim to show that the criticisms of the effects-based approach can be addressed not by moving away from the consumer welfare criterion but by integrating it into a broader perspective that also takes into account the protection of the competition process itself.
dc.descriptionEn 2005, la Comisión Europea abogó por un enfoque más económico de la aplicación de las leyes de competencia. El único criterio para evaluar la legalidad de una práctica de mercado debe ser la evaluación de sus efectos netos sobre el bienestar de los consumidores. El Tribunal de Justicia se mostró reacio a adoptar este enfoque hasta la sentencia de Intel de 2017. Su aprobación —que es discutible en la medida en que la sentencia puede dar lugar a diferentes interpretaciones— puede parecer paradójica en el medida en que es concomitante con un fuerte desafío al criterio del bienestar del consumidor en los Estados Unidos. La finalidad de este artículo es volver sobre la historia de este criterio, en particular en su adopción en el contexto de la ley de competencia de la UE. Nuestro objetivo es demostrar que las críticas al enfoque basado en los efectos pueden abordarse sin alejarse del criterio de bienestar del consumidor, sino integrándolo en una perspectiva más amplia que también tenga en cuenta la protección del propio proceso de competencia.
dc.descriptionEm 2005, a Comissão Europeia advogou por uma abordagem mais econômica da aplicação das leis de concorrência. O único critério para avaliar a legalidade de uma prática de mercado deve ser a avaliação de seus efeitos líquidos sobre o bem-estar dos consumidores. O Tribunal de Justiça se mostrou relutante a adotar essa abordagem até a sentença da Intel de 2017. Sua aprovação, que é discutível na medida em que a sentença pode dar espaço a diferentes interpretações, pode parecer paradoxal, visto que é concomitante com um forte desafio para o critério do bem-estar do consumidor nos Estados Unidos. O objetivo deste artigo é voltar à história desse critério, em particular sua adoção no contexto da lei de concorrência da União Europeia. Além disso, demonstrar que as críticas à abordagem baseada nos efeitos podem ser tratadas ao não nos afastarmos do critério de bem-estar do consumidor, mas sim integrando-o numa perspectiva mais ampla que também considere a proteção do próprio processo de concorrência.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/xml
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherUniversidad Militar Nueva Granada
dc.relationhttps://revistas.unimilitar.edu.co/index.php/dere/article/view/4722/4771
dc.relationhttps://revistas.unimilitar.edu.co/index.php/dere/article/view/4722/4839
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dc.rightsDerechos de autor 2021 Prolegómenos
dc.sourceProlegómenos; Vol. 24 No. 47 (2021); 55-78
dc.sourceProlegómenos; Vol. 24 Núm. 47 (2021); 55-78
dc.sourceProlegómenos; v. 24 n. 47 (2021); 55-78
dc.source1909-7727
dc.source0121-182X
dc.subjectAnti-competitive practices
dc.subjecteffects-based approach
dc.subjectconsumer welfare
dc.subjectordoliberalism
dc.subjectEuropean Union competition law
dc.subjectprácticas anticompetitivas
dc.subjectenfoque basado en los efectos
dc.subjectbienestar del consumidor
dc.subjectordoliberalismo
dc.subjectderecho de la competencia de la Unión Europea
dc.subjectpráticas anticoncorrenciais
dc.subjectabordagem baseada em efeitos
dc.subjectbem-estar do consumidor
dc.subjectordoliberalismo
dc.subjectdireito da concorrência da União Europeia
dc.titleIs the Consumer Welfare Obsolete? A European Union Competition Law and Competition Perspective
dc.title¿Es obsoleto el bienestar del consumidor? Una perspectiva de la competencia en la Unión Europea
dc.titleO bem-estar do consumidor se tornou obsoleto? Uma perspectiva de concorrência da União Europeia
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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