Audios
Repeated games: cheating, punishment, and outsourcing [Game theory]
Autor
Polak, Ben
Resumen
Educação Superior::Engenharias::Engenharia de Produção Educação Superior::Ciências Sociais Aplicadas::Economia Presents part of course, Game theory , when Professor Polak shows how in business or personal relationships, promises and threats of good and bad behavior tomorrow may provide good incentives for good behavior today, but, to work, these promises and threats must be credible. Presents the grim strategy forms such an equilibrium provided that we are patient and the game has a high probability of continuing. Discusses less draconian punishments, and find there is a trade off between the severity of punishments and the required probability that relationships will endure. Applies this idea to a moral-hazard problem that arises with outsourcing, and find that the high wage premiums found in foreign sectors of emerging markets may be reduced as these relationships become more stable