Tesis
Roads to objectivity
Autor
Corona Chavarría, Adrian
Institución
Resumen
Tesis de Maestría presentada a la Facultad de Filosofía de la Universidad Veracruzana. Región Xalapa. Individual Representationalism is a view that tries to constitute the way in which a mental state can be
exhaustively individuated without appealing directly to the exterior world but always derivatively and
supplemented by means of intrinsic properties, that is, by representations available in the individual’s
psychology. Anti-individualism tries to break this independence between the mental and nonmental; antiindividualism
claims that causal relations to specific attributes of the environment are both ineliminable
and, some of them , non-representational, yet determine what representations, perceptions, images and
thoughts an individual has.
This dissertation explores the essence of the incompatibility between individual representationalist
theories of m ind and anti-individualism , as w ell as the connection this has on philosophical
skepticism. In doing so, it presents a criticism of the faux or idealist or overintellectualized or romantic
roads to objectivity that ignore the depth and relevance of externalist accounts of reality and mindindependence.
Two anti-individualist theories of perception, Perceptual Objectivity and Enactive Perception, are
examined and rivaled against a form of philosophical skepticism known as the New Wittgenstein. The
New Wittgenstein is deceivingly representationalist, so I argue. A main part of this dissertation’s goal is
to clarify what I think are some common misconceptions regarding anti-individualism’s depth and
implication.