dc.date.accessioned2021-08-23T22:54:33Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-19T00:23:16Z
dc.date.available2021-08-23T22:54:33Z
dc.date.available2022-10-19T00:23:16Z
dc.date.created2021-08-23T22:54:33Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10533/251416
dc.identifier1150067
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/4482679
dc.description.abstractKnowledge of oneself is not easy to attain. Plato was aware of this and in this paper we aim to show that he suspected then, like psychologists know now, that one's introspective capacity to attain knowledge of oneself is very much restricted and that we must rely on the other as a source of such knowledge. We further argue that, for Plato, this knowledge is not easily achieved given not only the shortcomings of the first-person perspective but also the limitations of the third-person one. Keywords: Knowledge of the self
dc.description.abstractintrospection
dc.description.abstractself-ignorance
dc.description.abstractself-error
dc.description.abstractcognitive bias
dc.languageeng
dc.relationhttps://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-23762017000100017
dc.relationhandle/10533/111557
dc.relation10.4067/S0718-23762017000100017
dc.relationhandle/10533/111541
dc.relationhandle/10533/108045
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 Chile
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/
dc.titleSelf-Knowledge In The Alcibíades I, The Apology Of Socrates, And The Theaetetus: The Limits Of The First-Person And Third-Person Perspectives
dc.typeArticulo


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