info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Truth without standard models: some conceptual problems reloaded
Fecha
2018-01Registro en:
Barrio, Eduardo Alejandro; Da Ré, Bruno; Truth without standard models: some conceptual problems reloaded; Taylor & Francis; Journal Of Applied Non-classical Logics; 28; 1; 1-2018; 122-139
1166-3081
CONICET Digital
CONICET
Autor
Barrio, Eduardo Alejandro
Da Ré, Bruno
Resumen
A theory of truth is usually demanded to be consistent, but w -consistency is less frequently requested. Recently, Yatabe has argued in favour of w-inconsistent first-order theories of truth, minimising their odd consequences. In view of this fact, in this paper, we present five arguments against w-inconsistent theories of truth. In order to bring out this point, we will focus on two very well-known w-inconsistent theories of truth: the classical theory of symmetric truth FS and the non-classical theory of naïve truth based on ᴌukasiewicz infinitely valued logic: PAᴌT.