Artículos de revistas
Efficiency of Two Side Investments in an Equilibrium Unemployment Framework
Registro en:
Documentos de Investigación 260: 2010, p. 1-20
Autor
Navarro, Lucas
Institución
Resumen
This paper investigates the e¢ ciency of investments by Örms and workers in a matching
model with high- and low-productivity jobs. Search is sector speciÖc and random within sectors. Search frictions and ex-post bargaining imply that wage inequality arises as a result of the di§erence in investment costs between the sectors. The e¢ ciency properties of the equilibrium are analyzed under the particular division in bargaining proposed by Hosios (1990). The conclusion is that the equilibrium is ine¢ cient, with a too low fraction of workers and a too high vacancy-unemployment ratio in the high-productivity sector. The opposite happens in the low-productivity sector.