Artículos de revistas
Singular Reference Without Singular Thought
Registro en:
Manuscrito, 39, 1, p.33-. 2016.
2317-630X
S0100-60452016000100033
10.1590/0100-6045.2016.V39N1.FM
Autor
Martone
Filipe
Institución
Resumen
In this paper I challenge the widespread assumption that the conditions for singular reference are more or less the same as the conditions for singular thought. I claim that we refer singularly to things without thinking singularly about them more often than it is usually believed. I first argue that we should take the idea that singular thought is non-descriptive thought very seriously. If we do that, it seems that we cannot be so liberal about what counts as acquaintance; only perception (and memory) will do. I also briefly discuss and reject semantic instrumentalism. Finally, I argue that while singular reference is cheap, singular thought comes only at a price.
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