Artículos de revistas
Earnings Management and Contests for Control: An Analysis of European Family Firms
Registro en:
Journal of CENTRUM Cathedra, Volume 4, issue 1, (Mar 2011): 100-120
1851-6599
10.7835/jcc-berj-2011-0053
Autor
Jara, Mauricio
López, Félix J.
Resumen
Artículo In this paper, the influence of large shareholders on earnings management in family-owned firms is analyzed using a sample of firms from nine European countries. How contests for control for the largest shareholder and the existence of a controlling coalition in family-owned firms affect earnings management is considered. It was found that increases in the contestability of control by the largest shareholder reduce earnings management in family-owned firms. The results also show that in firms in which the largest shareholder is a family member, a second or third family shareholder increases discretionary accruals.