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CONVERGENCE METHOD, PROPERTIES AND COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY FOR LYAPUNOV GAMES
(International Journal of applied mathematics and computer science, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2011)
We introduce the concept of a Lyapunov game as a subclass of strictly dominated games and potential games. The advantage of this approach is that every ergodic system (repeated game) can be represented by a Lyapunov-like ...
SETTING COURNOT VS. LYAPUNOV GAMES STABILITY CONDITIONS AND EQUILIBRIUM POINT PROPERTIES
(International Game Theory Review, 2015-07-27)
In potential games, the best-reply dynamics results in the existence of a cost function such that each player’s best-reply set equals the set of minimizers of the potential given by the opponents’ strategies. The study of ...
Stackelberg security games: Computing the shortest-path equilibrium
In this paper we consider a game theory approach for representing a real-world attacker–defender Stackelberg security game. In this novel approach the behavior of an ergodic system (repeated stochastic Markov chain game) ...